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1Abstract
We consider and explore structural breaks in a day-by-day time series of civilian casualties for the
current Iraq conﬂict: an undertaking of potential interest to scholars of international relations,
Comparative and American politics. We review Bayesian change point techniques already used
by political methodologists before advocating and brieﬂy describing the use of reversible-jump
Markov chain monte carlo techniques to solve the estimation problem at hand. We ﬁnd evidence
of four change points, all associated with increasing violence, approximately contemporaneous
with some important state building events. We conclude with a discussion of avenues for future
research.
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21 INTRODUCTION
The study of inter– and intra– state conﬂict is a mainstay of political science. As an international
conﬂict that increasingly resembles a civil war, the current situation in Iraq provides both a test-
ing ground for theories on the duration and termination of di erent types of conﬂicts (e.g. Filson
and Werner, 2004; Stam and Bennett, 2006), as well as a rich source of data for empirical work.
This is quite separate from its obvious importance as a political, military and economic event in
progress. In part due to its contemporaneous nature, political scientists have access to carefully,
daily recorded, military and civilian casualty information: an unusual and excitingly ﬁne level of
detail. Of course, the utility of any data is only as good as the way it is explored and analyzed.
Here, we suggest that a fruitful approach for political scientists lies in examining the time series
for (potentially multiple) structural breaks and their e ects. For scholars of American politics and
public policy, the way that these change points correspond with administration statements on the
progress of the war may be particularly intriguing. This notion extends to Comparative institutions
scholars interested in the potentially pacifying e ect of various post-war ‘state-building’ activities.
In keeping with the increasing acceptance and popularity of Bayesian methods in political science,
in undertaking our study we justify and adopt a novel (to political science) approach that uses a
more general form of Markov chain monte carlo (MCMC) techniques, well-known to statisticians
as ‘reversible jump’ MCMC (Green, 1995). We do so primarily for computational reasons.
Examining civilian casualty data from the o cial cessation of hostilities (May 2003) to May 2007,
we ﬁnd evidence of four change points. These breaks are approximately contemporaneous with (1)
the capture of Saddam, and the emergence of the Abu Graib scandal (late 2003 to Spring 2004); (2)
the installation of the Iraqi Interim Government, and the subsequent handover of power to the Iraqi
Transitional Government (Summer 2004 to early 2005); (3) the legislative elections for, and negoti-
ations to form, the ﬁrst full-term Iraqi government (the early months of 2006); (4) the assumption
of security and some military responsibilities by the Iraqi government (August/September 2006) .
In every case, the frequency with which such incidents occur is increasing after the break.
32 BACKGROUND AND DATA
The United States and allied forces attacked Iraq with aerial bombardments, followed by a land
invasion, on March 20th, 2003. By mid-April, Iraq’s capital city, Baghdad and Saddam Hussein’s
home region of Tikrit was under allied control—bringing a de facto end to the war. A fortnight later,
on May 3rd, 2003, President Bush declared that allied combat operations would now o cially cease.
As with all conﬂicts, the war has not been costless. What marks the Second Iraq War though, is the
continued loss of life after the Iraqi army was formally defeated. At the time of writing, some 3,000
coalition force members had died in addition to at least 57,000 civilian fatalities since military oper-
ations began (sources are http://icasualties.org/oif/ and http://www.iraqbodycount.org/
respectively. Some studies have placed the number of civilian fatalities at a much higher number.
For example, Burnham et al. (2006) claim up to 600,000 deaths). Violence has not yet abated
despite the passing of some presumably important landmarks in what some characterize as the de-
velopment of Iraq’s polity and stability: for example, the capture of Saddam (December, 2003), the
placing of the former dictator on trial from ‘crimes against humanity’ (July 2004) and his execution
(December 2006); the killing of Saddam’s sons, Uday and Qusay (July 2003); National Assembly
elections (January 2005); the drafting (December 2003–March 2004) and subsequent referendum
approval (October 2005) of a constitution; the election of a new president (April 2005) and the
forming of a governing coalition (May 2006); the execution of an Al-Qaeda ringleader, Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, thought responsible for planning many terrorist attacks (June 2006); the assumption
of security responsibility by the Iraqi government (September 2006). We are interested in violence
for the post-(o cial) war period: although we certainly cannot make ﬁrm causal claims, our study
will enable us, for example, to make statements about the plausibility of various events as “turn-
ing points” and allows us to pass some exploratory comments on how new democratic institutions
and state apparatus developments are e ecting Iraqis. Hence our study focuses on May 3rd 2003
through to the present time (May 2007).
Our data are drawn from iraqbodycount.org a (online) data base that records civilian deaths
in Iraq “that have resulted from the 2003 military intervention by the USA and its allies. The
4count includes civilian deaths caused by coalition military action and by military or paramilitary
responses to the coalition presence (e.g. insurgent and terrorist attacks)” (Dardagan and Sloboda,
2006). The data in raw form record deaths at the day level, from January 2003 through to the
present and are compiled from (primarily Western) media reports and other sources. Since uncer-
tainty often exists on precise numbers, especially when di erent agencies have conﬂicting ﬁgures
for the same incident, the data base reports a range of possible death numbers from a ‘minimum’
to a ‘maximum.’ Potential ‘over-counting’ is a concern, so we use the ‘minimum’ and deﬁne a
‘casualty incident’ as involving ﬁve deaths or more (our ﬁndings below are similar when we deﬁne
the incident threshold at ten or twenty deaths). For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the
(changing) frequency of attacks, rather than their size (above our minimum). In part this is a
behavioral assumption: we would contend that, at least initially, terrorists were able to control how
often they planned to inﬂict casualties, rather than how many. There were 1682 such incidents in
our time series, and we graph their occurrence in Figure 1; there, the solid line is the cumulative
incident count, the solid dots are simply jittered incident occurrences (for which the y-axis is not
the scale). We also report various dates that may of interest and to give readers a sense of timing
perspective.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Although univariate time series work is not regularly encountered in political science, it is valuable
in the current context as a ‘ﬁrst glance’ exploration before covariate information becomes available.
We think that such work helps to prompt both theorizing and data gathering for more nuanced
and sophisticated analysis.
3 ESTIMATION PROBLEM
The single change point problem, estimated using Markov chain monte carlo techniques, has been
discussed for and by political scientists elsewhere (see Western and Kleykamp, 2004). That treat-
ment is similar to the (hierarchical) presentation given by Carlin, Gelfand and Smith (1992):
suppose y =( y1,...,yT) is a vector of observations of the random variable Y (casualty in-
5cidents) over time and let f and g be unknown densities in the same parametric family with
yi   f(Y | 1),i=1 ,...,k, yi   g(Y | 2),i= k +1,...T. We wish to estimate k the (single) change
point which takes (discrete) values in {1,2,...,T}. A frequentist approach proceeds by maximizing
L(y)=
k  
i=1
f(yi| 1)
T  
i=k+1
g(yi| 2) (1)
to obtain k and the parameters  1 and  2 (which for the count case are arrival rates for a Poisson)
if they are of interest. A Bayesian approach proceeds by placing a prior  (k) on the change point.
There are computational advantages of a Bayesian MCMC approach here since (a) maximizing (1)
requires optimization in a space that is not continuous (recall that k is discrete) which, say, Gibbs
sampling does not; (b) the resultant non-nested models may be straightforwardly compared using
Bayes factors (Chib, 1998); (c) missingness in y is handled systematically. This is quite apart from
the philosophical appeal of Bayesian approaches of which political scientists are increasingly aware
(for example, Gill see 2002, 1–6 and Jackman 2004, 486).
Here, we are interested in exploring multiple change point and such work (Bayesian or other-
wise) is much less common in political science. In part this is because, with respect to the logic
above, there are profound computational di culties in generating proposals for situations where
we suspect there are more than a couple of change points. One approach, suggested by Chib (1998)
and applied to American politics by Park (2006), treats the change point model as a type of time
series Markov mixture model, where the observations are (assumed) drawn from latent state vari-
ables. Notice that this approach requires separate Markov chain monte carlo runs for the di erent
numbers of change points hypothesized (Leonte, Nott and Dunsmuir, 2003). An alternative solution
is to use reversible jump Markov chain monte carlo which allows us to complete the computational
operations in one ‘go’ as well as allowing us to be a priori agnostic over the number of parameters
to be estimated.
Typically when MCMC is used in political science the parameter vector   has a known num-
6ber of components, denoted n. For the single change point problem n = 3 (these are k,  1 and
 2). Now consider a very di erent scenario which arises for an unknown number of k change
points: for every possible k, we need to estimate 2k +1 parameters—the change points themselves
and then parameters of the densities before, between and after them. That is, we have a set of
Mk = {1,...,K} candidate models of our data generating process, each with a di erent number
of parameters. Otherwise put, the number of parameters is, of itself, a parameter. More formally,
the kth model in Mk has associated parameter vector  k which contains nk parameters such that
 k   Rnk.
Continuing to denote our data vector y, the joint distribution becomes:
p(k, k,y)=p(y|k, k)p(k, k)
= p(y|k, k)p( k|k)p(k). (2)
Since we have a constant of proportionality we can rearrange and reexpress (2) into the more
familiar
p(k, k|y)
      
posterior
  p(k)p( k|k)
      
prior(s)
p(y|k, k)
      
likelihood
. (3)
Notice that p(y|k, k) is simply the likelihood, while p( k|k) is the prior for the parameter vector,
given a particular data generating process and p(k) is the prior on the model itself. We wish to
generate samples from (3). Setting up a Markov chain to do this may be di cult though, because
it is required not simply to move around the parameter space for any particular  k, but to also
‘jump’ from space to space (from model to model) depending on the k in question.
This type of problem is given a general formulation by Green (1995), known as reversible jump
MCMC (RJMCMC), of which standard MCMC algorithms are special cases. Green explicitly dis-
cusses a Poisson count change point problem and we followed his approach for our application
(though we varied the priors somewhat to ensure that our results were robust to such alternative
7speciﬁcations). Although well known to statisticians, the details somewhat technical, and readers
are guided to Brooks (1997) who gives an accessible overview for political scientists.
The implementation of RJMCMC, in particular the e ciency of proposals, can be problematic
in practice and Hastie (2005) devotes considerable attention to designing a technique to do this.
We used his Automix sampler (with a maximum of ten possible change points) for our estimation.
Though the full details are somewhat technical, drawing on Hastie (2005, 202–203), it is instructive
to summarize the way that the model of the data generating process is selected. The ﬁrst two stages
of the sampler produce a Normal mixture distribution for every possible value of k. In the third
stage, assuming the Markov chain is currently in state (k, k), Automix allocates the parameter
vector  k to a component lk of the mixture and uses it to standardize  k. Then a new model k  is
proposed, along with a commensurate (new) mixture which has component l 
k. To obtain the new
state vector   
k , the standardized vector is transformed using the mean and the covariance matrix
of the mixture component l 
k . Automix then accepts the proposed state (k ,  
k ) with some speciﬁed
acceptance probability. A particularly pleasing feature of this software is that issues such as burn
in and the requisite number of post-burn iterations are handled automatically.
4 RESULTS
There are three sets of (posterior) distributions that interest us here:
1. the posterior of k: this enables us to answer the question “how many change points in the
data?” This will have support k =1 ,...,kmax where kmax = 10.
2. the posterior of change point positions conditional on some estimated k. More intuitively,
this enables us to answer the question “given a particular number of change points, when did
they occur in the data?”
3. the posteriors of the rates for each period, conditional on some estimated k: that is, given
the number of change points, and when they occurred, we can answer “what were the e ects
of the change points?”
8In Figure 2 we display the posterior for k, the number of change points. The strongest evidence (in
the sense of Kass and Raftery (1995)) is for k = 4 and we will explore this possibility exclusively.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In Table 1 we summarize the results for k = 4 model in a way that answers questions 2 and 3 above.
The ﬁrst break, in late January 2003 occurs between incidents that may be of import. The ﬁrst was
the capture and arrest of Saddam at a farmhouse near Tikrit in December 2003. The subsequent
months saw both an insurgency uprising lead by rebel Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in Baghdad
and the di usion of abusive photographs taken at the Abu Graib prison where coalition forces were
holding Iraqi detainees. The political fallout of the latter was profound, and criticism of the Bush
administration by allied, Arab and other politicians was widespread. This event, arguably, rallied
and spurred sectarian hatreds and violence. The break marks a sharp increase in the casualty rate,
doubling from one incident every four days, to one every two days.
The second break occurs in August of 2004, a little while after the Iraqi Interim Government
assumed power from the Coalition Provisional Authority (in June 2004). This new entity, under
the Premiership of Iyad Allawi was subsequently recognized as the legitimate sovereign government
of Iraq by both the United Nations and the Arab League (an important regional player). Allawi
quickly announced new security measures to tackle insurgency forces and was criticized by some for
their draconian nature. As part of this o ensive, the Iraqi Interim Government began to censor the
critical reports of media outlet al Jazeera. Included in the highest posterior density interval for this
break is the January 2005 democratic elections for the Iraqi Transitional Government. This change
point saw an increase in violence from one incident every two days, to four incidents every ﬁve days.
The third break itself, in February 2006, occurs not long after the elections for the ﬁrst full term
Iraqi government (December 2005) and at around the time of the protracted negotiations to form
a new coalition government. These talks were deadlocked for some time, lasting from December
through to April of the following year. Jawad al-Maliki, leader of the Islamic Dawa Party would
become Prime Minister after the original candidate Ibrahim al-Jaafari proved unacceptable to the
9Sunni and Kurdish representatives in parliament. Once again, violence surged after this point with,
on average, ﬁve incidents occurring every three days.
The fourth and ﬁnal break occurs in September of 2006, a time when the Iraqi government as-
sumed control of national security for approximately 70 percent of the country. The ﬁrst speciﬁc
task of the Iraqi Security Forces was, and is, to tame insurgency (with coalition logistical and
medical support). By now incident rates were approaching three per day.
[Table 1 about here.]
In Figure 3 we summarize our ﬁndings in a di erent way: the open circles represent the median
incident rate between the relevant breaks which are demarcated by the broken lines. For reference,
we again draw the jittered incidents themselves on the plot.
[Figure 3 about here.]
5 DISCUSSION
Our study—to our knowledge the ﬁrst that uses RJMCMC in a political science context—suggests
that violence is increasing and that important state-building activities, like democratic elections,
are contemporaneous with upticks in casualties. Apart from this rather grim substantive conclu-
sion, we found that investigating time series on violence to be an interesting and fruitful exercise.
If a Bayesian approach is pursued, then reversible jump techniques seem most helpful. We hope
that our brief article will encourage others in political science to consider such methods in future.
As noted above, we do not establish causation in any sense: the events we noted were simply occur-
ring at around the same time as the breaks in the time series and it is speculative that they may be
of direct importance. This suggests some interesting avenues for future research: for example, one
possibility is that increasing violence is a product of an increasingly organized insurgency. On this
point, notice that the solid line in Figure 1 resembles a exponential curve of form F(t)=aert +  
(we are indebted to an anonymous TAS referee for this observation). Modeling—both theoretical
10and statistical—of this apparent pattern would allow us to think about the development of the
conﬂict in Iraq in a more systematic way. We leave this for future research.
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